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Abstract 
This thesis considers one of the most widely debated topics in modem European 
history: why the men of the Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing squads following the 
Wehrmacht as they advanced into Russia) participated in massacres of supposedly 
"undesirable" people. Although this topic has been discussed for many years, to date 
there has been no definitive consensus formed. This thesis examines issues of the official 
SS publication Das Schwarze Korps and records from the Nuremburg Trials ( contained in 
the Winfield B. Hale papers in the University of Tennessee's Special Collections Library) 
in order to bring both new evidence and a new opinion into this debate. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
One of the most hotly contested issues in contemporary scholarship on World 
War II is the question of what motivated the men of the Einsatzgruppen - mobile killing 
squads operating behind the lines of the advancing German Army - and other associated 
police units to participate in massacres of Jews and other "undesirables". What makes 
this topic so disturbing and important is not only its grisly nature but much more what is 
ultimately at stake in it: how both military and political organizations deploy violence to 
further their own ends, the role that ideology plays in this deployment, and how 
ostensibly "ordinary" people can be convinced to accept and even participate in this 
violence. In other words, this topic forces us to ask whether people capable of 
participating in genocide are born with that ability or whether a state can create and 
deploy such people to achieve its own goals. At present, one can identify two clear 
schools of thought on the issue. 
Christopher Browning presents the first significant position in his book Ordinary 
Men. 1 Here, Browning argues that the Order Police participants in these atrocities were 
not originally cold-blooded and fanatical ideological murderers, but were rather gradually 
desensitized to these killings ( at least partially by official design and peer pressure) as a 
result of their participation in large numbers of massacres.2 Specifically, Browning 
examines Reserve Police Battalion 101 's Einsatzgruppen service in Russia and their 
1 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998). 
2 The Order Police (ORPO) constituted one of the branches of the National Socialist 
police service along with the Security Police (SIPO) and Criminal Police (KRIPO). 
These civilian police units were often called in to augment the Einsatzgruppen when 
additional men were needed. 
1 
reactions to that service in order to document their gradual hardening to gruesome scenes 
of massacre. According to his thesis, the men of the ORPO began as "ordinary" people: 
law-abiding citizens who would never consider murder. By the end of the war, however, 
these previously "ordinary" men had become hardened killers. In short, Browning argues 
that killers are made, not born, and thus introduces the disturbing thought that virtually 
anyone could become a murderer, given the appropriate circumstances. 
Claudia Koonz represents the other major position in this debate. In her new 
book The Nazi Conscience, she argues that both the men officially assigned to the 
Einsatzgruppen, as well as their police and Wehnnacht auxiliaries, killed Poles, Jews, and 
other "undesirables" as a result of the National Socialist ideology that they had absorbed 
between 1933 and 1939, not due to short-term conditioning in the killing fields.3 In order 
to prove her thesis, Koonz examines German culture during the first six years of Nazi 
rule and how Hitler both influenced and controlled this culture. Thus, Koonz emphasizes 
ideology and faith in legitimating a violent political program culminating in genocide. 
The contrast between these two camps strongly resembles the longstanding debate 
between the intentionalist and functionalist schools of thought regarding the organization 
of the Nazi government. According to the intentionalists, Nazi policy against the Jews 
and other theoretically "undesirable" people was conceived and implemented by Hitler 
himself according to a long range "blueprint" that he had conceived in the 1920s which 
aimed at the final goal of the annihilation of Europe's Jews. Those who arranged for and 
actually committed the massacres were only following orders that had been passed down 
3 Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
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to them.4 This position corresponds roughly to Browning's thesis, as both positions hold 
that those men who were involved in the actual commission of genocide had been 
coerced into participating, for example by way of peer pressure, prospect of material 
gain, or threat of physical harm. The structuralists ( or "functionalists"), on the other 
hand, argue that although Hitler may have approved of his subordinates' actions in 
eliminating supposedly "undesirable" persons, he personally had, at best, only a very 
small direct role in their doings. Instead, these various subordinates took actions that 
they thought would please Hitler (what Ian Kershaw labels "working toward the 
Fiihrer"), and it was these actions that eventually evolved into the Holocaust in a process 
of "cumulative radicalization." This position corresponds roughly to Koonz's 
conclusions, in that both she and the structuralists assert that the men involved in 
genocide on the Eastern Front killed because they were ideologically convinced that their 
victims should die.5 
The aim of my master's thesis is to address the question of how supposedly 
"average" men from modem, "civilized" societies could be convinced to participate in 
genocide. This thesis will be divided into four parts. First, I will discuss Browning's and 
Koonz's arguments in more detail and situate them in the existing historiography dealing 
with the Einsatzgruppen's motivations. Most of the authors in the recent literature 
support Koonz's conclusions. For example, Alexander Rossino's recent book Hitler 
Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity concurs with most ofKoonz's 
4 See, for example, William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) and Lucy Dawidowicz's The War Against the Jews 
1933-1945 (New York: Bantam, 1986). 
5 The most prominent structuralist scholars are Martin Broszat, Dieter Pohl, Thomas 
Sandkuhler, and Hans Mommsen. 
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arguments with its thesis that the Einsatzgruppen who operated in Poland in 1939 were 
composed of highly convinced National Socialists who killed because they believed it 
was necessary.6 An older classic work, Hannah Arendt's controversial Eichmann in 
Jerusalem also supports Koonz, describing Adolf Eichmann as a mid-level bureaucrat 
who facilitated the Holocaust because he was convinced, apart from the "banality of evil" 
his bureaucratic work represented, that the Jews had to be destroyed. 7 
By contrast, Browning receives considerably less support in the historiography. 
Perhaps his strongest buttress is Eric Johnson's Nazi Terror.8 In this work, Johnson 
argues that the German people did not object to the Nazi regime, and specifically the 
Gestapo, not because they were convinced that Nazi ideology was correct but rather 
because the government did not deploy the full force of its terror against them and it was 
easy to get along with the state if one was not among the targeted groups. For example, a 
German accused of making defamatory remarks about Hitler could, provided that he had 
done nothing else wrong, expect a very minimal sentence or even no punishment at all. 
Thus, the German people tolerated the Nazi regime because it was not threatening to 
them personally. Factors quite distinct from fanatical conviction were at work. 
Daniel Goldhagen's book Hitler's Willing Executioners, which created a 
polemical riot when it first appeared, is of less use to a scholar of this particular set of 
6 Alexander Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity 
�Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2003). 
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1963). 
8 Eric Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans (New York: 
Basic Books, 2000). 
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questions due to the fact that it is in fact extremely limited in its analysis.9 For example, 
it does not take into account why, if Gennans wanted to eliminate the Jews specifically, 
they also enthusiastically murdered large numbers of other "undesirables," for example 
the disabled, homosexuals, and the Sinti and Roma peoples. It also virtually ignores the 
question of why, if the Gennan people were unique in wishing to extenninate the Jews, 
collaborators from other countries were so common.1° Finally, it does not take into 
account such factors as the distance of killing, which would significantly alter 
Goldhagen' s conclusions. 11 In other words, Goldhagen does not explain why, if the men 
of the Einsatzgruppen were truly motivated by ideology, the massacres they participated 
in were purposely designed to pennit them to see their victims as mere collective targets 
rather than as human beings. Were these men truly ideologically motivated, they should 
have been convinced that their victims deserved to die and should thus prefer to 
acknowledge their victims' individuality. Thus, Goldhagen's thesis is lacking in several 
respects. 
For the bulk of my research results, I will discuss the issues of the official SS 
organ, Das Schwarze Korps, dating from 1938 and 1939, in order to examine Nazi 
ideology on the eve of the Second World War and explore how thorough the ideological 
conditioning was in this elite literature. Specifically, I will be looking at articles and 
cartoons dealing directly with Jews. This material will allow me to assess the official 
9 Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1997). . 
10 Michael Marrus deals with the phenomenon of collaboration, along with a number of 
other topics, in his work The Holocaust in History (NY: New American Library/Duton, 
1989). 
11 See, for example, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman's On Killing: The Cost of Learning to Kill 
in War and Society (USA: Back Bay Books, 1997). 
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reasoning behind the decision to exterminate the Jewish people. I will also use 
prosecution documents from the Nuremburg Trials ( contained in MS 521 of the 
University of Tennessee's Special Collections) in order to ascertain whether the 
Einsatzgruppen 's motivation to kill during their operation in Russia can indeed be traced 
to ideology absorbed before the beginning of World War II. Specifically, I will examine 
war diaries and situation reports that contain concrete rationalizations for the mass 
murders that the Einsatzgruppen committed. Finally, I will discuss the conclusions I 
have formed as a result of my research. 
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Chapter II 
A Review of the Historiography 
Nazi psychology has long been one of the more hotly debated topics in modern 
German history. In the effort to understand this distinctively destructive mindset, the 
same body of evidence has generated a number of different conclusions among scholars, 
which this chapter will discuss and evaluate. This work can be divided into two opposing 
and (on the face of it) mutually exclusive camps. The first of these interpretive camps 
holds that the men of the Einsatzgruppen murdered those people whom the Nazi regime 
considered "undesirable" because the killers had absorbed Nazi ideology to the point that 
they were firmly convinced that such people had to die. Due to these ideological beliefs, 
the men had no qualms, moral or otherwise, about killing these "unwanted" persons. The 
other school of thought holds that the men of the Einsatzgruppen were not convinced 
murderers, but were rather gradually desensitized to scenes of slaughter by way of 
frequent exposure. Thus, it is argued, they did not kill because they wanted to, but rather 
because they had become acclimated to mass murder to the point that they were willing 
to participate in it when they were ordered to. 
In fact, primary source research indicates that the most accurate interpretation of 
this issue lies exclusively in neither camp, but rather in the ground between them. Using 
the 1938 and 1939 issues of Das Schwarze Korps (the official weekly publication of the 
SS) and the papers Winfield B. Hale ( one of the American judges at the Nuremburg 
trials), I will argue that although the propaganda promulgated by the Nazi regime 
convinced the men who later served in the Einsatzgruppen that "undesirables," and 
specifically Jews, needed to be eliminated, it did not, in and of itself, create at that time a 
7 
group of men ready and willing to perpetrate mass murder. Instead, specific conditions 
and catalysts during the war itself would truly forge this group, building on prewar 
influences. 
Claudia Koonz represents the first historiographical position discussed above in 
her work The Nazi Conscience. In it, she argues that what caused both the Holocaust and 
the German people's toleration of the Holocaust was the fact that German civilians had 
internalized an ideology, as promulgated by the Nazis, that posited the existence of a 
superior Aryan race that needed to fight for its survival against any number of inferior 
peoples. 12 Koonz argues ( along with more recent scholarship) that although Hitler 
stressed the anti-Semitic elements of his ideology early in his career, he quickly realized 
that this exclusive focus on racism was politically unwise: although the German people 
would tolerate violence against supposed political enemies, they "deplored [the] lawless 
attacks on Jews" frequently perpetrated by SA stormtroopers. 13 In order to circumvent 
this obstacle, Hitler used sympathetic academics to create what Koonz terms a 
"respectable racism" that non-radical Germans would accept over time. It "celebrated the 
heroic values that elevated the community over the individual, instinct over reason, 
authenticity over rationality, and hardness over empathy" and emphasized "a biological 
hierarchy of human value that placed Aryan over Jew and Slav, genetically healthy over 
'congenitally damaged,' and male over female." 14 In conjunction with this new 
"respectable" racism, Hitler at first passed only seemingly "moderate" anti-Semitic 
legislation. The German public was generally willing to accept these new laws "as an 
12 Koonz, Nazi Conscience, 6-8. 
13 Ibid., 39-40. 
14 Ibid., 68. 
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'adjustment' to offset what many believed were Jews' so-called 'special rights' in those 
areas." 15 Thus, Hitler's major challenge in the 1930s was to find a way to reconcile mild 
legal racism with SA hooliganism. 16 By 1939, the German people were "sufficiently 
prepared to accept a harsh solution to the Jewish question" instead of the more mild 
measures that had been taken previously. 17 War's crisis atmosphere would provide 
cover. According to Koonz, the Holocaust was made possible once Germany had 
reached this ideological point. 
Indeed, Hannah Arendt's work Eichmann in Jerusalem, originally published in 
1963� foreshadowed many of Koonz's conclusions. 18 According to Arendt, Eichmann 
lived according to Hans Frank's construction of "'the categorical imperative in the Third 
Reich ... Act in such a way that the Fuhrer knew your action, he would approve it. '" 19 
This formulation matches Ian Kershaw's recent underlining of the regime's motif of 
''working towards the Filhrer." Indeed, Eichmann was a very zealous servant, taking 
pains to make sure that Jews and other ''undesirables" were murdered according to plan, 
rejecting opportunistic changes: when "Himmler became 'moderate' [very late in the war, 
hoping to curry favor with the Western Allies], Eichmann sabotaged his orders as much 
as he dared, to the extent at least that he felt he was 'covered' by his immediate 
superiors," who were considerably more radical than Himmler was at that point.20 In 
short, Eichmann behaved as he did because he had been trained to obey the orders of th� 
15 Koonz, Nazi Conscience, 166. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 256. 
18 Arendt, Eichmann. 
19 Ibid., 136. Originally in Hans Frank's Die Technik des Staates (Munich, 1942). 
20 Ibid., 145. 
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Fuhrer who, in Eichmann's mind, was doing what was best (and therefore morally 
correct) for the country and thus facilitated the Final Solution because he believed that it 
had to be done. 
In terms of contemporary scholarship, Alexander Rossino argues unequivocally in 
his study, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity, that the men of the 
Einsatzgruppen killed as a result of ideology. 21 His work is intended as a corrective to 
the commonplace view that the Nazi leap to genocidal policies took place with the attack 
on the Soviet Union in 1941 - rather, Rossino reminds us, the 1939 campaign against 
Poland already crossed many crucial thresholds in violence against civilians. Rossino 
mentions specifically the German army's reprisal policy, which featured the execution of 
random civilians in order to punish an entire town for a particular crime. 22 Here, Rossino 
argues that the stunning levels of violence and brutality that the SS and parts of the 
Wehrmacht perpetrated in both Operation Tannenberg and Operation Barbarossa were 
due to their firm belief in National Socialist ideology, not immediate conditioning by 
war. Rossino begins his examination with Hitler's campaign against Poland - Operation 
Tannenberg. He argues that many Germans, and specifically high-ranking German 
officers (encouraged by Hitler), many of them conservative nationalists rather than 
fanatical Nazi activists, were eager to fight a war against Poland. Even after it became 
evident that Hitler "had decided mass murder and the extensive resettlement of Poles and 
Jews would be the twin elements of his plans for the Germanization of Poland," his 
officers continued to plan the assault, apparently with few to no moral qualms, showing a 
21 Alexander Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland. 
22 Ibid., 121. 
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basic moral consensus with the regime. 23 On the eve of the attack, German troops were 
told that ''this was a war 'against Polish impudence' and in defense of ethnic Germans 
who wished to be 'liberated from the Polish yoke'" and they attacked in order to "wipe 
away the shame of Versailles and come to the aid of their ethnic German comrades. "24 In 
other words, according to Rossino, many officers and soldiers involved in the attack 
against Poland were willing to kill non-Germans, including civilians, since these people 
needed to be removed in order to allow for the future Germanization of the region. It was 
this campaign (and its associated ideology) that formed "a critical first step in the 
amalgamation of Nazi ideology and military practice that would be central to Germany's 
Vernichtungskrieg against the Soviet Union and brutal anti-partisan campaigns in 
Serbia."25 In short, German atrocities perpetrated in both Poland and later in Russia were 
motivated by the ideology that German troops had absorbed long before the attacks. 
The political scientist Daniel Jonah Goldhagen also argues that those men who 
murdered Jews on the Eastern Front were motivated above all by ideology in his 
controversial book Hitler 's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust. 26 He does not, however, argue that Nazi ideology instilled anti-Semitic 
beliefs in theoretically "ordinary" men, but rather that these men were already anti­
semitic, due to the pervasive and centuries-long dominance of "eliminationist" hatred of 
23 Ibid., 10. 
24 Ibid. ,  27. 
25 Ibid. ,  2 27. 
26 The most prominent work on this subject is Raul Hilberg 's The Destruction of the 
European Jews (Chicago, 1961 ). 
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the Jews in German culture and society, and Nazi ideology was designed to take 
advantage of this prejudice.27 
According to Goldhagen, the German people were "animated by . . .  a particular 
type of anti-Semitism that led them to conclude that the Jews ought to die."28 Goldhagen 
designates this idea "eliminationist anti-Semitism." Although the Jews had been 
considered "dangerous aliens" for decades or centuries, there was a marked increase in 
anti-Semitic activity during the First World War. Among other things, anti-Semitic 
Germans accused the Jews of having compromised Germany's war effort by shirking 
active duty and using wartime conditions to turn a profit wherever they could, 
culminating in the notorious1916 "Jewish census" within the German army.29 The first 
years of the Weimar Republic only exacerbated this anti-Semitism: during the massive 
inflation that followed the war's end, many suffering Germans blamed their troubles on 
the Jews.30 Indeed, one official in Swabia remarked that one "hears everywhere that 'our 
government is delivering us over to the Jews. "'3 1  Anti-Semitism is said to have pervaded 
German culture to the point that it became impossible not to have an opinion on how the 
"Jewish Problem" could best be solved. 32 Thus, Goldhagen argues, by the time Hitler 
took power, the German people were already thoroughly anti ... Semitic and therefore 
27 Saul Frielander presents a modified form of this argument in his Nazi Germany and the 
Jews (New York: Harper Collins, 1997). In this work, he argues for the existence of a 
small core of radical anti-Semites who gained prominence during the Weimar republic 
and whose prejudices eventually found expression in the NSDAP. 
28 Goldhagen, Hitler 's Willing Executioners, 14. Emphasis in original. 
29 Ibid., 81-82. 
30 Ibid., 82. 
31 Ibid ., 82. 
32 Ibid. , 84. 
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primed and willing to go along with Hitler' s policies designed to eliminate the Jews by 
whatever means necessary. 
Goldhagen contends that this generally shared German anti-Semitism also 
motivated the men of the police units that worked with the Einsatzgruppen to kill Jews in 
cold blood. According to this theory, these men were not selected, unusual zealots when 
they joined the police force : indeed, they were "often chosen for service in a haphazard 
manner and were frequently the least desirable of the manpower pool. "33 They did not 
undergo any ideological screening upon recruitment, and they did not receive any 
intensive ideological training once they had joined, remaining "ordinary Germans."34 In 
spite of this lack of training, however, these men did their murderous work well. 
Goldhagen provides more support for his argument that police battalions killed as 
a result of ingrained anti-Semitism in the fact that, by contrast, killing Poles upset the 
men, while killing Jews did not. Goldhagen offers the example of Major Trapp's reaction 
to the killings of 78 Poles in retaliation for the killing of a single German sergeant: 
according to one of his subordinates, "our battalion commander [Trapp] was very shaken 
after this action. He even wept. He was what one would call a fine human being and I 
deem it impossible that it was he who had ordered the shooting of the hostages."35 Trapp 
was, however, supposed to kill 200 people in this action. Thus, he and his men 
proceeded to the Jewish quarter, where they murdered 1 80 with no apparent remorse.36 
33 Ibid., 1 8 1 .  
34 Ibid. , 1 8 1 .  
35 Ibid., 240. 
36 Ibid., 240. 
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Indeed, the men allowed their visiting wives to watch other actions, thus indicating their 
pride in their work. 37 
There are, unfortunately, a number of problems with Goldhagen's work in the 
context of the problem under investigation. Firstly, Goldhagen's theory can explain only 
the murders of Jews and Poles: Jews were murdered due to the perpetrator's anti­
semitism; Poles were killed out of "practical necessity." This theory does not explain 
why other groups were targeted for extermination. For example, not only Jews and those 
who helped them, but also dissident Catholics, homosexuals, and the supposedly 
"asocial" and "workshy" were interred and killed in the Nazi regime's  concentration 
camps. Because none of these groups were Jewish or even affiliated with the Jews, 
however, they must have been killed for reasons other than the eliminationist anti­
Semitism that Goldhagen postulates as central. Unfortunately, Goldhagen's argument 
contains no condition that would cover these cases, which are part of the larger complex 
of the Nazis' destructive urge and psychology of killing. Thus, we are forced to conclude 
that his work is, at best, limited. 
Christopher Browning represents the other side of this debate. In his important 
and highly regarded book, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 1 OJ and the Final 
Solution in Poland, he argues that the Einsatzgruppen and their auxiliary units were not 
primarily motivated to kill as a result of ideology, but rather were gradually desensitized 
as a result of being exposed to any number of gruesome scenes. As Browning puts it, 
like "much else, killing was something one could get used to. "38 He uses a case study of 
37 Ibid., 241 -245. 
38 Browning, Ordinary Men, 85. 
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Reserve Police Battalion 10 1  to prove his arguments. 39 He contends that before these 
men had been sufficiently "hardened," many of them either publicly objected to the mass 
shootings or found more subtle ways to shirk their duty as executioners. Indeed, some of 
their commanding officers did not expect the men to be able to carry out their shooting 
duties. For example, before one massacre Major Trapp offered "any of the older men 
who did not feel up to the task that lay before them [the opportunity to] . . .  step out.',4o 
Several of the men who did not take advantage of this offer later found other ways to 
shirk their duties. For example, several men appealed to First Sergeant Kammer, who 
allowed them to either accompany the trucks or to guard the truck route .41 Others '"shot 
past' their victims" or "spent as much time as possible searching the houses so as not to 
be present at the marketplace, where they feared being assigned to a firing squad."42 
Almost none of the men were willing to shoot small children or infants in cold blood. 43 
Browning points out, however, that this evasive response was frequently only temporary, 
as habituation set in. 
In later executions the men of Battalion 10 1  performed much more efficiently. 
Some of this increased participation was due to more advanced methods of killing. For 
example, Battalion 10 1  began working frequently with Hilfswillige (HIWI) battalions of 
native collaborators. These non-German units were frequently delegated the most 
39 It is important to note here that the men that Browning deals with in his study were 
civilian policemen, most of whom were unfit for regular military service, who had been 
attatched to the Einsatzgruppen in order to increace its numbers. Thus, they had not been 
subject to the same ideological and military conditioning as the men of the 
Einsatzgruppen proper had. 
40 Ibid., 57. 
4 1  Ibid. , 62. 
42 Ibid. ,  62-63 . 
43 Ibid. , 59. 
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distasteful tasks, including most of the shooting, which considerably reduced the 
psychological burden on the German policemen.44 The method used in the shootings 
themselves was also changed: policemen were no longer paired off with their victims as 
before, and shooters were rotated frequently. 45 Additionally, because the men had shot 
before, they "did not experience such a traumatic shock" as they had the first time.46 
101 's commanders also began purposely desensitizing the men by forcing those who had 
previously avoided shooting duty by various means to participate, to create a larger circle 
of shared complicity. For example, First Sergeant Ostmann told one of his men, " 'Drink 
up now, Pfeiffer. You're in for it this time, because the Jewesses must be shot. You've 
gotten yourself out of it so far, but now you must go to it. "'47 Many other "clerks, 
communications men, and drivers who had hitherto avoided direct participation in mass 
executions . . .  suddenly found themselves pressed into service by the local Security 
Police. "48 As a result of all of these factors, the men of Battalion 101 over time found it 
considerably easier to kill their victims. By 1943, when Battalion 101 was delegated to 
participate in the so-called "harvest festival" massacre, which constituted "the single 
largest German killing operation against Jews in the entire war," the only problem was 
disposing of the large numbers of bodies.49 Thus, Browning directly contradicts Koonz's 
conclusions. His emphasis is on the power of habituation to brutality in practice, not in 
ideological preparation. 
44 Ibid., 85. 
45 Ibid., 85. 
46 Ibid., 85. 
47 Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Soceity: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-
1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 108. 
48 Ibid., 1 1 1 . 
49 Ibid., 1 35, 1 41 .  
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Another specialist on the Nazi period, Robert Gellately, supports many of 
Browning's conclusions in his work, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial 
Policy 1933-1945. Although Gellately concentrates on the Gestapo instead of on the 
killing squads of the Einsatzgruppen, he also contends that the German people .did not 
support the Nazi regime's actions against the Jews due to overriding anti-Semitism. 
Instead, he argues that German society at large did not protest against Nazi rule because 
"many law-abiding citizens, out of respect for the legal norms, simply complied and co­
operated with the new regime . . .  many could choose to ignore its revolutionary 
character."50 Thus, many who were not enthusiastic about the new regime chose to 
conform to it. 
The Gestapo meted out harsh punishments to those who chose not to conform: 
both in Germany and in other occupied territories, the "Gestapo responded to any dissent 
with policies on the 'Jewish question' by redoubling its efforts in order to obtain 
compliance through police pressure, where necessary fulfilling its mandate with methods 
that gained a reputation for utter brutality."51 Indeed, word quickly spread that one could 
be arrested and even killed on the suspicion of disobedience. 52 Thus, many of those who 
did not comply with the Nazi regime willingly rearranged their lives in order to remain 
above suspicion and avoid any confrontation with the Gestapo. 
Eric Johnson agrees with many of Browning's and Gellately's conclusions in his 
work, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans. Johnson contends that 
the German people may truly not have known about the genocide of the Jews in a 
so Gellately, Gestapo and German Society, 137. 
51 Gellately, Gestapo and German Society, 186. 
52 Ibid. 
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comprehensive way until December of 1942 at the latest. After conducting an exhaustive 
study of the Gestapo 's records for the cities of Cologne and Krefeld and a survey of some 
residents of Cologne who had lived through the Nazi era, Johnson advances several very 
interesting conclusions. Firstly, he argues that the German population was not a totally 
complicit body. For example, he tells us that 53% of the people who responded to a 
survey he conducted while researching his book reported having listened to illegal radio 
broadcasts, primarily to the BBC. 53 Indeed, listening to "illegal foreign-radio broadcasts 
was a largely passive activity so commonplace that it could have been considered normal 
had it not been outlawed by the regime."54 At the same time, Johnson reports that 75% of 
his respondents stated that they had never feared arrest during the Third Reich, although 
they had committed some sort of action officially designated as a crime. His explanation 
for this phenomenon is that since the Gestapo (which was a relatively small organization) 
devoted most of its resources to persecuting Leftists, Catholics, and Jews, it simply did 
not have the manpower available to police the German population at large .55 Johnson 
concludes that: 
[f]ew Germans knew everything about the Holocaust . . .  [b]ut . . .  millions of ordinary German 
citizens, coming from every social, political, and religious background and from every corner of 
German society, certainly knew that masses of Jews were being murdered. Some Germans did not 
know this until relatively late in the war. Large numbers of Germans knew much earlier on.56 
Johnson attributes the German public's silence about the fate of the Jews not to anti­
Semitism, but rather to "a lack of moral concern about the fate of those who were 
perceived as outsiders and from a tradition of obsequious submission to authority that the 
53 Johnson, Nazi Terror, 258. 
54 Ibid ., 259. 
55 Ibid., 284. 
56 Ibid., 458. 
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Nazis cultivated but did not originate."57 Indifference is seen as key, rather than 
murderous intent on the part of the bulk of the German population. 
In a distinctively different variation on this debate, German scholars Getz Aly and 
Susanne Heim also argue in their controversial book, Architects of Annihilation: 
Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction, that virulent, pervasive anti-Semitism did not 
motivate the Einsatzgruppen to kill. Instead, they point to the existence of a very 
different motivating factor - money. According to this theory, the Nazi regime removed 
Jews and other "undesirables" from Germany and other occupied territories in order to 
strengthen Germany's economy, as part of an overriding drive for modernization and 
rationalization. Aly and Heim contend that Nazi demographers had understood 
unemployment in the "towns and cities, poverty and 'underemployment' in agriculture, 
'backwardness' and low productivity . . .  as the consequence of a steadily growing human 
population surplus."58 This surplus was particularly acute in Eastern Europe, and these 
"excess" people were said to be "exerting a 'population pressure ' on Germany's borders" 
as people who could not find work farther east entered Germany in hopes of finding 
jobs.59 According to Nazi -economic logic, European Jews were the most expendable 
population in the affected areas: as Peter-Heinz Seraphim put it in 1 938, "the 'Jewish 
question' in Eastern Europe amounted to a 'population policy problem on a massive 
scale."'60 Thus, in order to revitalize flagging European economies, Jews needed to be 
removed. Initially, Nazi planners intended to corral Jews into ghettoes, where they would 
57 Ibid., 458. 
58 Getz Aly and Susanne Heim, Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of 
Destruction, trans. A.G. Blunden (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2002), 59. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 7 1 . 
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stay until they were deported.6 1  It quickly became obvious that there was nowhere to 
deport these Jews to, and so another solution had to be found. Initially, the Nazi 
government tried to establish industries in the ghettoes so that the Jews could provide 
nearly free labor and so fortify the German economy.62 Economic analysts quickly 
determined that the ghettoes could not be made profitable, and so their inhabitants were 
deported to the "Final Solution" in the Eastern concentration and death camps.63 In short, 
Aly and Heim argue that the Jews were massacred neither due to pervasive German anti­
Semitic ideology nor desensitization brought on by witnessing multiple massacres, but 
rather because the presence of Jews was believed to be harmful to the German economy. 
The bureaucratic imperatives of economic rationality are stressed, in this account, rather 
than ideological hatred. 
In short, what we see in the current literature dealing with Nazi psychology is a 
general division between two schools of thought: one that argues for the existence of a 
pervasive anti-Semitic ideology that motivated the men of the Einsatzgruppen to murder 
Jews, and another that holds that these men murdered for other reasons. The two major 
supporters of the idea that the Einsatzgruppen murdered due to ideology are Claudia 
Koonz and Hannah Arendt. Goldhagen supports this argument, but as I have discussed, 
his work contains significant flaws. The most prominent author arguing against this 
concept of the primacy of ideology is Browning, who contends that the Einsatzgruppen 
were taught to kill via a gradual process of desensitization. Gellately and Johnson also 
argue that the German people were not motivated solely by ideology: they contend that 
6 1 Ibid., 1 62. 
62 Ibid., 1 86. 
63 Ibid., 208-210. 
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"ordinary" people generally conformed to the Nazi regime voluntarily. Finally, Aly and 
Heim agree that the Nazi regime did not exterminate the Jews based on anti-Semitic 
ideology: instead, they contend that this genocide was designed to improve Germany's 
economic situation. The following chapter will pursue the issue of ideology in more 
detail, as it examines the ideological themes present in the 1 938 and 1 939 issues of Das 
Schwarze Korps in order to determine precisely what type of anti-Semitic ideology 
existed among the men of the SS .  
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Chapter III 
"Mainstream Ideology:" Images of Jews in Das Schwarze Korps 
Das Schwarze Korps, published weekly in Berlin from 1938 to 1945, was the 
official press organ of the SS. Although Oberfiihrer Gunter D' Alquen was its official 
publisher, Das Schwarze Korps was in reality controlled by Reinhard Heydrich after 
April of 1935.64 Heydrich was a man to be reckoned with in the Nazi hierarchy : as 
Reidinger put it, sometimes "Heydrich' s sullen figure in menacing black S S uniform and 
varnished boots would be pointed out fearfully to foreign journalists . . .  They would be 
told that they had just seen the most dangerous man in Germany. "65 
Heydrich began his career in Nazi structures in 1931 as the head of the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD). 66 In 1934, he became the head of the security police as well. His 
domain increased again in 1939 when he took over the RSHA, including the criminal 
police and the Gestapo. He remained in this position until he was assassinated by two 
members of the Free Czechoslovak Forces in 1942.67 Politically speaking, Heydrich was 
very close to Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS and Gestapo. It was Heydrich who 
originally saw the need for an intelligence service, and it was Heydrich who eventually 
convinced Himmler to create the SD by "detaching the Information officers - in plainer 
words, informers - from their respective SS units and forming them into a new arm [the 
64 Gerald Reidinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945 (New York: Da Capo Press, 
Inc., 1957), 32. Reitlinger's work followed in the footsteps of Karl Dietrich Bracher's 
work The German Dictatorship, which constitutes the first truly scholarly study of the 
Third Reich. 
65 Ibid., 31. 
66 The SD was officially the Security Service of the SS. Practically, it functioned as a 
secret political police. 
67 Ibid., 215, 467. 
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SD]."68 As the head of this new intelligence service, Heydrich worked closely with 
Himmler on the various purges of the SS.69 In short, Heydrich and Himmler frequently 
worked together, a fact that became particularly pertinent when Himmler became the 
Chief of German Police - and thus the official head of all German police organizations -
in 1936.70 
Das Schwarze Korps (under Heydrich's leadership) catered primarily to the well­
educated men who "claimed to be a self-selected racial elite" who comprised the bulk of 
the SS.71 Based on these readers ' tastes, Das Schwarze Korps printed intellectual and 
theoretical articles as well as allegedly "tasteful" political cartoons. In other words, Das 
Schwarze Korps did not aim to attract readers with lewd content and crass sensationalism 
(as for instance Julius Streicher 's notorious anti-Semitic publication Der Sturmer), but 
rather intended to "win the respect of not only well-educated Nazis but of thoughtful 
readers everywhere."72 As Claudia Koonz put it, the newspaper 's "editors trusted their 
readers to think for themselves within the bounds of National Socialism."73 Das 
Schwarze Korps is thus an intriguing primary source for the self-understanding of the 
self-proclaimed new German racial elite . 
This chapter examines the issues of Das Schwarze Korps that appeared in 1938 
and 1939. I chose to concentrate on these two years specifically because most scholars of 
the Nazi period agree that 1938 and 1939 represent the point at which Nazi ideology 
68 Ibid., 37. 
69 Ibid., 38 . 
70 Ibid., 467. 
71 Robert Koehl, "The Character of the Nazi SS," The Journal of Modem History, 34, No. 
3 (September 1962): 275-283. 
72 Koonz, The Nazi Conscience, 240. 
73 Ibid.2 41. 
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became violent enough and the German people tolerant enough of this ferocity (with 
Kristallnacht as the key moment) to allow the mass murder of the Jewish people. 
According to this argument, because it was this ideology that allowed the practice of 
genocide, it is also this ideology that would theoretically have driven the men of the 
Einsatzgruppen to kill countless people as they moved through Eastern Europe and 
Russia. I have chosen Das Schwarze Korps to investigate this ideology in part because 
the SS, and specifically Heydrich, controlled it. As such, it would have had to conform to 
Nazi ideology and indeed would be a prime, official example of the same. As Reidinger 
explains, Heydrich "was the real idealist of the SS and the things that he practiced were 
part of his ideal of the good German."74 Even without this conviction, "Heydrich had to 
conform to Himmler's SS code" at least externally, including its ideology.75 
Additionally, because this publication catered to the well-educated, it should provide an 
unusually articulate and nuanced analysis of Nazi ideology and the Nazi mindset. 
In my research, I concentrated on studying articles and cartoons that deal directly 
with Jews. I also considered articles dealing with governmental systems and forms of 
media that Jews allegedly control, since these articles provide another means of studying 
the "official" Nazi position on Jews. Finally, I looked at obituaries and advertisements 
printed in Das Schwarze Korps in order to get an additional sense of how the SS saw 
itself as a racial vanguard. 
A prime conclusion is that Das Schwarze Korps presented the Jews primarily as 
an economic threat as late as 1938-1939. For example, in an article entitled "Davor 
74 Reidinger, Alibi of a Nation, 32. 
75 Ibid., 32. 
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graust uns!" (translation: "We dread the thought"), a section entitled "Against 'our' 
Jews"76 states that "We can once again experience a boycott instituted by the Rumanian 
government [which had been taking measures against Jews living in Rumania] against 
our goods because not one factory in National Socialist Germany can break with its 
Jews."77 
At first glance, it seems ridiculous for the Nazi government to worry about 
Rumania boycotting its goods. Indeed, Rumania accounted for a mere one percent of 
Germany's total foreign trade. 78 This boycott, however, put a serious crimp in 
Germany's  ambitions toward dominating a European economic sphere. As Aly and 
Heim put it, Nazi planners at the time envisioned "the division of Europe into a series of 
more or less interdependent economic zones, whose functions would be assigned to them 
by the German Reich and whose economic activities would be coordinated in the 
interests of German capital."79 Because Rumania was economically dependent, as will be 
discussed in more detail later, it was already well on its way to becoming one of these 
desired subordinate economies. Thus its boycott, and hence its assertion of economic 
independence, logically caused serious concern among Nazi intellectuals. 
Another argument for forcing Jews out of the German economy appears in the 
article "The Legend of the Decent Jew." 80 Also published in 1 938, this article 
encouraged German businessmen to avoid doing business with Jews by conducting 
76 In original: "Gegen 'unsere' Juden." Das Schwarze Korps, January 1 3, 1 938. 
77 In original: "Ja, wir konnen noch einmal erleben, daB unsere Waren einfach offiziell 
von der rumanischen Regierung boykottiert werden, weil sich einige Fabriken im 
nationalsozialistischen Deutschland nicht von ihren Juden trennen konnen." 
78 Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 994), 364. 
79 Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 216. 
80  In original: "Die Legende vom anstandigen Juden" 
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background checks on the representatives of the companies they work with. 8 1  "The 
Legend of the Decent Jew" tells the story of an honest Aryan businessman who arranged 
a transaction with a representative of another company. Although he had no second 
thoughts at the time, he later became suspicious of the representative's name : 
Wertheimer. At this point, "the businessman arranged to ask [Wertheimer's] firm 
whether this Wertheimer was a Jew. If the answer is yes, then the [Aryan] businessman 
must send the goods [ that he bought from Wertheimer] back. "82 If all Aryan 
businessmen behaved as this businessman did, then the German people would never have 
to deal with Jewish merchants at all. 83 Thus, if all good German businessmen were 
properly vigilant, the author suggests, Germany could be free of the deleterious effects 
Jews exercised on its economy. 
According to Das Schwarze Korps, the international community did not truly see 
the threat, economic or otherwise, that the Jews posed. Indeed, the magazine 
complained, international opinion supported the Jews to the point that it frowned upon 
those countries that attempted to protect or improve themselves by eliminating their 
Jewish inhabitants. One sees this point illustrated particularly well in a 1938 cartoon 
entitled "Rumania and the 'World Press"' (Figure 1). The illustration shows a downcast 
Rumanian and two equally downcast Jews standing outside a building flying the Nazi 
flag. The caption (expressing the Rumanian's plaint) reads, "As long as we suffered from 
8 1  "Die Legende vom anstandigen Juden," Das Schwarze Korps, January 18, 1938. 
82 In original : Das beranlaBt den Kaufmann, bei der Firma Bauen anzufragen, ob dieser 
Wertheimer etwa Jude sei. Wenn ja, muBte er den Auftrag zuriick ziehen." 
83 "Die Legende vom Anstandigen Juden," Das Schwarze Korps, January 18, 1938. 
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lice in our fur, we were a cultured people; now, when we rid ourselves of these parasites, 
we are barbarians ! "84 
It should be noted that both the cartoon's caption and its title employ language 
designed to disparage Jews. The word "Weltpresse" (world press) in the title contains an 
implied reference to supposed Jewish international perfidy. According to Nazi ideology, 
"world Jewry" had a controlling interest not only in international finance, but also in the 
international press. Thus, when these newspapers published reports of the "barbarous" 
Rumanians systematically pushing Jews out of Rumania, foreign Jews not yet threatened 
by such "enlightened" peoples as the Rumanians were said to be using their fairly 
significant international leverage to justify (and therefore reinforce) Jewish dominance in 
Rumania. In other words, the title's wording indicates that the Jews were to blame not 
only for Rumania's poor economic situation, but also, in their international incarnation, 
for preventing Rumanians from improving that situation by forcing Jews out of the 
country. 
The term "Kulturvolk" in the cartoon's caption is also significant. "Kultur" 
translates directly as "culture," but it also carries a connotation of superiority. According 
to Liah Greenfeld, an outstanding historian of nationalism, nineteenth century Germany 
considered its culture to be superior to that of the rest of Western Europe, a key concept 
in German self-understanding of the period. According to contemporary German 
sentiment, "Germany was a universal nation par excellence, that is . . .  only it truly 
84 In original: "Solange wir Uiuse in unserem Pelz duldeten, waren wir ein Kulturvolk ; 
jetzt, wo wir uns dieser Parasiten entledigen, sind wir Barbaren !" 
"Rumanien und die 'Weltpresse,' Das Schwarze Korps, January 13, 1938. 
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represented humanity and perceived its purpose. "85 In short, should "the German not 
assume world government through philosophy, the Turks, the Negroes, the North 
American tribes [i.e., culturally inferior peoples,] will finally take it over and put an end 
to the present civilization. "86 As time went on, German intellectuals articulated German 
superiority even more vigorously, to the point that Adam Millier claimed that even 
though the Germans are naturally humble, "the German mind is forced to ascribe to itself 
as an advantage over all other nations its obedient and pious understanding of everything 
alien, even if this prostration and understanding may sometimes degenerate into the 
idolatry of foreign habits and persons."87 Eventually, however, the German people would 
not be threatened by contamination by inferior cultures, because "Germany , the fortunate 
heartland, . . . will dominate the world by its spirit. "88 In other words, "Kultur" refers not 
just to culture, but to a transcendent, "superior" culture that will eventually replace all 
other, "inferior" cultures. By employing this term, the cartoonist offers a snide 
commentary on the international community's perception of the Jews : when Rumania 
tolerated the Jews, who were purposely detrimental to the Rumanian people, the 
Rumanians were considered to be a "Kulturvolk"; when Rumania, in its own defense, 
attempts to exclude Jews, the Rumanian people become barbarians. In short, the caption 
portrays the Jews as a threat to a world that they have, by and large, hoodwinked into 
defending them. 
85 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 366. 
86 Ibid., 366. 
87 Ibid., 367. 
88 Ibid. 
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On reflection, it is worth asking why Rumania comes to occupy this prominent 
position in the mental universe of an SS magazine. Rumanian politics in January and 
February 1938 matched German political ideals very closely . This cartoon probably 
refers specifically to the changes to the Rumanian constitution that were made under the 
Goga-Cuza government. This regime came to power in January 193 8 when Octavian 
Goga's National Peasant's Party fused with Alexandro Cuza's extremely anti-Semitic 
League of National Christian Defense.89 Although this regime only retained power for 
forty days before King Carol II's dictatorship began in February 1938, they managed to 
make a number of constitutional changes before their replacement. The most important 
of these changes denied Jews Rumanian citizenship (the so-called "Law of the Blood"), 
removed Jews from the Rumanian press establishment, barred Jews from government 
service, and most importantly, declared that "Rumanians would have priority in all 
economic enterprises and cultural institutions. "90 It is to this last change, which 
effectively removed Jews from Rumanian society, that Das Schwarze Korps 's cartoonist 
is probably referring. 
It was primarily Rumania's economic situation at that time that made these 
amendments possible. Rumania, and especially Bucharest, had been industrializing 
rapidly during the 1930s. Peasants migrating to the cities provided an abundant and 
cheap source of labor for this new industry. Most of these peasants, ironically, had been 
impoverished by the agrarian reform laws introduced between 1918 and 1921 that had 
broken up many of the older agricultural estates and distributed the resulting land to 
89 Israel Gutman, ed., Encyclopedia ·of the Holocaust, vol. 3 of Encyclopedia of the 
Holocaust (NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), s.v. "Romania." 
90 Gutman, Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 1293-1294. 
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peasants.9 1  Unfortunately, "many [of these] holdings were too small to be viable and 
continued to be subdivided through inheritance."92 Peasants were also taxed heavily, 
making their situation even more precarious.93 Finally, most peasants suffered from 
heavy debt, which they were hard put to pay off. 94 Thus, many migrated to the cities in 
search of factory jobs to supplement their meager agricultural incomes. 95 
Industrial development was curtailed, however, by the depression that hit in the 
early 1930s.96 This depression was fortunately short, and between 1934 and 1938 "the 
overall value of large-scale industrial production almost doubled from 34,900 million lei 
to 64,600."97 Part of the reason for this acceleration was political support on the part of 
the state: contemporary Rumanian politicians and governments hoped that expanding 
Rumanian industry would "assure both . . .  economic and political independence. 98 For 
all these industrial gains, however, the Rumanian economy still operated at a 
disadvantage: the Rumanian domestic market could not absorb all of the goods that 
Rumanian industry produced. 99 As such, Rumanian manufacturers sought foreign 
markets. By 1939, the most important of these markets was Germany, which imported 
32 per cent of Rumania's total exports. Germany was also Rumania's principal supplier, 
providing 39 per cent of her total imports. 100 
91 Hitchins, Rumania, 34 7. 92 Ibid. , 35 1. 
93 Ibid., 354. 
94 Ibid., 373. 
95 Ibid., 357. 
96 Ibid. , 357. 
97 Ibid., 360. 
98 Ibid., 374. 99 Ibid. , 362. 
100 Hitchins, Rumania, 363-364. 
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In short, the Rumanian economy had seen drastic improvement over a 
surprisingly short period of time. As we have seen in the preceding analysis, 
"mainstream" Nazi ideology likewise attributed much of Germany's economic 
improvement to the measures that excluded Jews from the German economy. Indeed, 
Rumania society at the time was extremely anti-Semitic. Thus, it makes sense that this 
cartoonist would conclude that Rumania must have pushed Rumanian Jews out of the 
economy in order to allow for its stunning improvement. He merely capitalizes on this 
assumed situation in order to comment on what he perceives as the state of international 
politics. 
Even after Kristallnacht, the major themes dealing with supposed Jewish perfidy 
in Das Schwarze Korps do not change drastically. For example, an article of November 
24, 1938 entitled "Jews, what now?" posits once more that Jews have hoodwinked most 
other countries into welcoming them. 10 1  Indeed, Jews have supposedly conned these 
countries to the point that they are "too cowardly . . .  to concede that there is a "Jewish 
Question," much less take action to solve this "Problem. " 1 02 As always, Germany cannot 
solve this problem itself: as the author puts it, "Germany . . .  is not able to solve its 
'Jewish Question' outside of Germany because we do not own anything but this land, 
which we must free of the Jews."103 In a new twist, this article hints a rather surprising 
"solution": "because they [the Jews] know just as well that the existence of a true Jewish 
10 1  Das Schwarze Korps, November 24, 1938. 
102 In original : "Die Demokratien waren bisher selbst zu feige, ilberhaupt zuzugeben, daB 
es eine Judenfrage gabe." Das Schwarze Korps, November 24, 1938. 
103 In original : "Deutschland selbst ist nicht in der Lage, seine Judenfrage au�erhalb 
Deutschlands zu lo sen, denn wir besitzen niclits als dieses Land, das wir von den J uden 
befreien mussen." Das Schwarze Korps, November 24, 1938. 
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state - Palestine is only an English contrivance - [ would cause] all host peoples to also 
deport 'their' Jews there." 1 04 Thus, Nazi propaganda had not yet begun advocating the 
wholesale murder of European Jews - instead, it would still be content to solve the 
"problem" through deportation. As such, we do not yet see the ideology of extermination 
that would theoretically need to be present in order to motivate the men of the 
Einsatzgruppen to kill during the Russian campaign. 
Again accenting the international mission of anti-Semitism, Das Schwarze Korps 
maintained, the working classes of foreign countries realized that the Jews posed a 
serious threat to them, unlike their political leaders. We see this point clearly in a cartoon 
appearing in Das Schwarze Korps on January 26, 1939 dealing with the situation of the 
unemployed in England (Figure 2). Titled "English Unemployed," 105 the cartoon shows 
two disheveled Englishmen (who are presumably out of work) sitting in front of a poster 
encouraging passerby to 'help the poor emigrated Jews. "' 106 Another unemployed man 
wearing a false "Jewish" nose is tipping his hat to the men in front of the poster. In the 
caption, one of the seated men says to the Jewish man, "Where do you find in our misery 
the 'humor', Bill? The fellow puts a carnival nose on his face!" The supposed Jew 
replies, "Idiot. Do you think I want to starve with you? I'm going to pass myself off as 
an emigrated foreign Jew!" 107 According to this cartoon, only honest, non-Jewish 
104 In original : "weil sie ebensogut wissen, da� die Existenz eines wirklichen Judenstaates 
- Palastina ist ja nur eine englische Zweckerfindung - alle WirtsvcHker veranlassen 
wurde, 'ihre' Juden gleichfalls dahin abzuschieben." Das Schwarze Korps, November 
24, 1938. 
105 In original: "Englische Arbeitslose." 
106 In original: "Helf den armen emigrierten Juden!" 
1 07 "Englische Arbeitslose." Das Schwarze Korps, January 26, 1939, p. 1. In original: 
"Wo du bei unserem Elend nur den 'humor' hemimmst, Bill. Pappt sich der Kerl eine 
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workers starve in England - the Jewish unemployed can avoid such a fate by sponging 
off honest English citizens as "refugees" from such "enlightened" countries as Germany 
and Rumania. In short, England's leadership is not as advanced as Germany's is - they 
have not yet realized that they need to force Jews out of their economic life in order to 
protect "true" Englishmen. This notion was very much in line with the cynical 
suggestion that Nazi exclusion of German Jews would also 'export anti-Semitism', as 
other countries found themselves host to impoverished Jewish refugees. 
Das Schwarze Korps does not, however, does not confine its portrayal of the 
supposed "Jewish threat" to the economic sphere. Although the economic theme is very 
prominent, there are a considerable number of discussions portraying the "Jewish threat" 
in other forms. For example, Das Schwarze Korps expresses deep concern about Jews 
infiltrating the Aryan race. _This point is made clearly in the newspaper's discussions 
about Jews who assume German names in order to pass as Aryans. For example, an 
article from February 9, 1939, entitled "So One Should not be Named," tells the story of 
a good, "authentic" German named Isidor von Leeb. Von Leeb's name appeared 
mistakenly on a list of Jewish businesses that Das Schwarze Korps published in 1938. At 
this, von Leeb of course protested, and the newspaper acknowledged its mistake in a 
story designed to demonstrate the continued perfidy of the Jews, whom it blamed for the 
misunderstanding. According to the article, von Leeb had appeared on the list simply 
because many Jews shared his surname. Von Leeb, however, was not Jewish: indeed, 
the "church register showed that [ von Leeb' s] line had been pure Aryan for 7 or 8 
Faschingsnase ins Gesicht ! - Idiot. Meinst du, ich will mit euch verhungem? Ich geh' 
jetzt als emigrierter Auslandsjude !" 
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generations." 108 The confusion had come from the Jews named von Leeb. They had not 
been born with this reputable surname, but rather had "first been called Levy or Lob and 
then undertook a small shift of sound, for reasons that are transparent," and began calling 
themselves by the aristocratic name ofvon Leeb. 109 Thus, what had once been a noble 
German name was now allegedly corrupted by dishonest Jews who were once again 
appropriating and polluting German culture for their own gain. 
This fear of "racial pollution" is also seen in the birth announcements published in 
Das Schwarze Korps. This fascinating section became extremely prominent in mid- 1939, 
as Hitler's unleashing of the Second World War approached. This portion of the 
newspaper is designed very simply - it is a one or two page spread that states the name of 
the child born, the names of its parents, how many children are now in the family, and 
features pictures of some of the older children in these families. It is in these pictures that 
we see the overriding concern with racial purity and its visual representation (Figures 3 
and 4). All of the children portrayed in these photographs are stereotypically Aryan ­
they have blond hair, blue eyes, fine-boned faces, and are even dressed in traditionally 
"German" clothes. The reader can also infer that the parents of these children are racially 
"pure." According to the SS marriage code (Heiratsgenehmigung), both "parties to the 
marriage were expected to show proof of Aryan ancestry as far back as 1 750 and proof of 
hereditary soundness of constitution. The SS man's bride had to submit to a medical 
108 In original: "Kirchenbuchereintragen bis zur 7 or 8 Generation zurilck arischer 
Herkunft." Das Schwarze Korps, February 9, 1939. 
109 In original: "solche namlich, die erst Levy oder Lob heissen und dann eine kleine 
Lautverschiebung aus durchsichtigen Grunde vornahmen." Das Schwarze Korps, 
February 9, 1939. 
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examination and provide testimonials as to her philosophy of life. " 1 10 Thus, the birth 
announcements in Das Schwarze Korps not only announce the births of children in to S S 
families, they also promote childbearing among "racially pure" couples in order to 
produce more Aryan children, by celebrating an idealized and officially sanctioned model 
of family. 
This emphasis on increasing the number of "Aryan" children in Germany is 
echoed in the secondary literature. Concerns with fertility and population policy predated 
the Nazi rise to power. As Mark Mazower writes in Dark Continent: Europe 's Twentieth 
Century, German women "read magazines like Weimar's  Die Deutsche Hausfrau (The 
German Housewife) . . .  or visited one of the many traveling health exhibitions organized 
by the Dresden Hygiene Museum in order to ensure the 'national fitness and the physical 
and mental health of future generations. '" 1 1 1  For all the effort toward encouraging 
childbearing in the 1 920s and 1 930s, however, Germany's  "racially sound" population 
grew very slowly. Even SS families experienced lagging growth: although SS men "were 
expected to lead the way in ideological and sexual fervor . . .  [ as of 1 939] 61 per cent of 
the SS were bachelors, and its married men averaged only 1 . 1  children per family."1 12 
This slow growth rate led to nightmarish "images of an overcrowded globe, of a Europe -
whose own population is dwindling and aging - being swamped by fast-breeding 
immigrants from the Third World." 1 1 3 
1 10 Reidinger, Alibi of a Nation, 30. 
1 1 1  Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe 's Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2000), 83. 
1 12 Ibid., 86. 
1 1 3 Ibid., 87. 
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Das Schwarze Korps is, of course, also careful to tout Hitler's victories over the 
allegedly pernicious Jews living in Germany. Indeed, the image of Hitler presented is 
almost unbeliveably positive, showing Hitler as the prophetic and stalwart savior of the 
German people. For example, Hitler is lauded extremely obviously in the April 20, 1939 
edition of Das Schwarze Korps; indeed, this issue was intended to honor Hitler on his 
birthday. As Himmler puts it in this article, "On his fiftieth birthday we send the Fuhrer 
our heartfelt wishes for good luck and thank him for all he has done for the German 
Volk." Himmler expresses his hope that Hitler will be with them for many more years. 1 14 
This issue also features a number of pictures of Hitler with cross-sections of the grateful 
German people. For example, a page titled "Father of the People" shows young, 
stereotypically Aryan children saluting Hitler, Hitler shaking hands with an archetypal 
German peasant, Hitler greeting a jubilant crowd, and finally Hitler greeting a group of 
working people. The centerpiece of this issue is a pencil sketch of Hitler standing 
proudly in front of an- outline of Germany with light radiating from behind him. At his 
feet is a mass of people saluting and waving the Nazi flag. The lettering reads, 
"Reverence and thanks . . . for the greatest son of our people." 1 1 5 Thus, this issue presents 
and celebrates virtually unadulterated admiration of and gratitude to Hitler. According to 
the sentiments presented here, Hitler has revitalized Germany and the German people and 
made it possible for Germany to be regarded as the powerful country it was before the 
much-hated Treaty of Versailles. 
1 14 Das Schwarze Korps, April 20, 1939. 
1 1 5 In original " Erfurcht und Dank . . .  dem groBten Sohne unseres Volkes". Das 
Schwarze Korps, April 20, 1939. 
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Finally, Das Schwarze Korps promotes a virulent culture of violence to its 
readers. Although this violence is not specifically directed against Jews, it does 
forshadow the murders on the Eastern Front with its emphasis on the necessity and glory 
of appropriately applied violent solutions. This culture can be seen most clearly in the 
obituaries for SS men that the newspaper printed after Germany's invasion of Poland in 
1939. Although these entries do express sadness over the loss of a loved one or friend, 
they emphatically praise that man's death as a noble sacrifice in Germany's service. For 
example, on February 26, 1939, the leader of the SS office in Donau, Kaltenbrunner, 
published an obituary in Das Schwarze Korps for SS-Brigadefilhrer Hubert Klausner. It 
read, in part, "On 12 February 1939 our comrade, . . . Hubert Klausner, died. He was a 
leader and comrade in the deep despair of our country. No one will forget him." 1 16 An 
obituary for Friedrich Grafvon der Schulenburg (submitted by no less than Heinrich 
Himmler himself) praised Schulenberg as "a shining example of an irreproachable 
soldier, a true National Socialist and a fearless follower of our Fuhrer as a great, noble 
human being." 1 17 In other words, these men did not simply die - they died gloriously and 
to great effect. Klausner, an ethnic German living in Austria, served his people - i.e. the 
German Volk - during a difficult time in its history, while Schulenberg set an example as 
an ideal National Socialist. In short, these men made one of the most noble sacrifices 
possible - they died in service of the Nazi cause. 
1 16 In original: "Am 12. Februar 1939 starb unser Kamerad ... Hubert Klausner. Er war 
Fuhrer und Kamerad in tieffer Not unserer Heimat. Keiner wird ihn vergessen." Das 
Schwarze Korps, February 26, 1939. 
1 17 In original : "ein leuchtendes Vorbild als untadeliger Soldat, als treuer 
Nationalsozialist und furchtloser Gefolgsmann unseres Fuhrers und als groBer, edler 
Mensch." Das Schwarze Korps, May 25, 1939. "Edler Mensch" signifies someone who 
is renowned for his wisdom and love of humanity. 
38 
As Ian Kershaw points out in his work The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the 
Third Reich, obituaries written in this style were hardly unique to Das Schwarze Korps, 
but rather often appear in the press. In this study, Kershaw identifies several formulae 
that families of the fallen commonly used in these announcements regardless of what 
newspaper they were eventually published in. The two most frequent phrases indicate 
that the man in question died "For People and Fatherland" or "For Filhrer, People, and 
Fatherland." 1 1 8 Mentions of the Filhrer were particularly common before the 
Wehrmacht's crushing defeat in Stalingrad. For example, 41 percent of death 
announcements posted in the Frankischer Kurier mentioned Hitler in 1940. The 
Augsburger Nationalzeitung and Munchner Neueste Nachrichten showed similar results, 
with 62 and 44 percent respectively of all obituaries posted mentioning the Filhrer in the 
same year. 1 19 Thus, the idea of the heroic soldier who died in the service of his country 
and leader is hardly unique to Das Schwarze Korps: rather, this idea was present 
throughout German society in the years leading up to the Second World War. 
One can also see attributes of this culture of violence in the advertisements 
printed at the end of each issue of Das Schwarze Korps. Indeed, using only the products 
advertised here, one could stage an impressive military campaign. The most frequently 
advertised items in these sections are various forms of firearms. For example, the April 
13, 1939 edition of the newspaper contains an advertisement for the Model 38 Sauer 
pistol. According to the advertisement, this pistol has "All the merits of a revolver and a 
1 1 8 Ian Kershaw, The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 188. 
1 19 Ibid. 
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pistol united in one weapon . . .  A masterpiece by J.P. Sauer and Son." 1 20 The Mauser is 
also a popular weapon. The July 1 3, 1939 edition of Das Schwarze Korps contains an 
advertisement for the Mauser Rifle reading: "MA USER: The German small caliber rifle 
of international renown. Ask for a free brochure." 12 1 The accompanying picture shows 
two men in hunting garb sitting on a bench in a rural setting admiring a Mauser rifle 
(Figure 5). Another advertisement recommends the Mauser for those who participate in 
sport clubs and praises it as "the time-tested original Mauser sport weapon." 122 
Das Schwarze Korps advertises other military items as well. For example, the 
July 20, 1939 edition of the paper promoted steel helmets manufactured by Bath and 
W agawa of Dresden. This advertisement states that these helmets are available in 
multiple colors and can "also be used for air-raid protection and fire brigades." 1 23 Their 
primary purpose, use in the conduct of war, is not stated explicitly. Das Schwarze Korps 
also advertises military-style boots made in Munich. According the manufacturer's 
description, these boots are "Marching boots and uniform boots in one." 1 24 One satisfied 
customer, Herr Forstmeister Schwenke, wrote that he did not have to resole his boots 
until after he had marched over 400 kilometers in them. 125 Although the advertisements 
1 20 In original: "Alle Vorzilge von Revolver und Pistole meisterhaft in einer Waffe 
vereint . . .  Ein Meisterwerk von J.P. Sauer & Sohn." Das Schwarze Korps, April 1 3, 
1939. 
12 1 In original: MAUSER: Die deutsche Klein-Kaliher Bilchse von Weltruf. Verlangen 
Sie kostenlose Druckschrift." Das Schwarze Korps, July 1 3, 1939. · 
1 22 In original : "Die bewahrten original-MAUSER Sportwaffen." Das Schwarze Korps, 
July 27, 1939. 
123 In original: "schwarz u[nd]. farbig auch f[tir] . Luftschutz und Feuerwehr." Das 
Schwarze Korps, July 20, 1939. 
124 In original : "Marschstiefel und Uniform-Zugstiefel in all." Das Schwarze Korps, 
April 06, 1939. 
123 Ibid. 
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for various types of gun changed frequently, those for boots and helmets were very long­
lived: the same steel helmets are advertised in the last 1939 edition of Das Schwarze 
Korps, and the boots appear until the second-to-last. 126 In short, one could equip a small 
army using those martial items advertised in Das Schwarze Korps. 
In conclusion, what these issues of Das Schwarze Korps tell us is that Nazi 
ideology presented the "Jewish threat" as being primarily economic even in 1938 and 
1939. Through their perfidy and worldwide conspiracy, they had allegedly been 
crippling Germany's economy and the individual German's well-being for years. Only in 
recent years, after Germany had recognized the threat the Jews posed had that nation 
been able to improve its situation. The international community, however, did not 
recognize Germany's wisdom, in large part because most world governments and 
virtually all international newspapers were said to be controlled by Jews . Das Schwarze 
Korps also highlights Germany's victories over the Jews by advertising Hitler's successes 
in strengthening Germany . The newspaper also expresses concern with_ preserving the 
Aryan race, either by preventing Jewish infiltration or by encouraging Aryan couples to 
procreate in order to further the race. Finally, Das Schwarze Korps provides a taste of 
things to come with its promotion of a virulent culture of violence . 
In short, we do see indoctrination in these issues of the newspaper, but it is not 
targeted indoctrination to kill. Das Schwarze Korps does portray Jews as a threat, but 
this threat is primarily economic. The solution to this problem is also not yet "Final": 
instead, the "Jewish Problem" can be solved merely by deporting the Jews. Mass murder 
is not yet necessary. Thus, what we see here is not the type of indoctrination that would 
126 Das Schwarze Korps, December 2 1 ,  1939; Das Schwarze Korps, December 14, 1939. 
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explicitly motivate men to kill Jews. Rather, according to these issues, the Jews do not 
need to be killed, but rather excluded. The next chapter will consider whether or not 
these "moderate" themes, in one form or another, influenced the Einsatzgruppen' s 
reasoning relative to the mass murder soon to ensue on the Eastern Front. 
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Chapter IV 
Ideology on the Front Lines: Reports of the Einsatzgruppen from the Nuremburg 
Trials 
Finally, this study of whether or not the variety of propaganda distributed in Das 
Schwarze Korps influenced SS men serving on the Eastern Front turns to examine a 
second major source, the Winfield B. Hale Nuremburg Trials Papers. This collection 
contains the materials that Winfield B. Hale collected while serving as an American 
judge at the Nuremburg Trials. Among other things, these papers contain the 
prosecution's exhibits from several of the defendants tried at Nuremburg, including 
several men who either worked closely with or were in charge of Einsatzgruppen. These 
documents were translated into English for the judges ' convenience and were annotated 
by Hale during the trials. 127 It should be noted that these translations only comprise 
excerpts of the documents themselves, as full translations of the massively extensive 
originals would have been far too time-consuming for both the translators and the judges. 
The documents relevant to this study are composed primarily of situation reports or 
combinations of situation reports and memoranda that were created by the commander of 
a particular Einsatzgruppe or Einsatzkommando and then submitted to Berlin. 128 Some 
of these documents (although not all) contain various justifications for the wholesale 
murders that the Einsatzgruppen and -kommandos committed. 
127 Each of these translations has been certified by the translator with the phrase "I, 
[Name of Translator, translator 's identification number] , hereby certify that I am 
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a 
correct and true translation of excerpts from [document number]." 
128 Situation reports generally contain five sections consisting of an overview of the 
activities of the Einsatzgruppen in general followed by one section for each of the 
Einsatzgruppen describing its specific activities. Occasionally, these last four categories 
are further subdivided into headings for individual Einsatzkommandos or specific types 
of activity. 
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The Einsatzgruppen were originally formed for service in Poland during 
Germany's 1939 invasion. They were "composed primarily of men from the Gestapo, 
Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo; Security Police), Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) and 
Kriminalpolizei (Kripo; Criminal Police). 1 29 These groups were controlled through an 
office in SD Headquarters called Zentralstelle II P (meaning Central Office II Poland) 
under the authority of Franz Six. 1 30 The Einsatzgruppen were technically to be composed 
of 500 men each, divided into 100-man Einsatzkommandos, although this number varied 
considerably during the war. 1 3 1 There were a total of five Einsatzgruppen serving in 
Poland: I, II, III, IV, and V. Additional units were added when the situation warranted 
their existence. 1 32 Officially, their mission was to combat "all elements in foreign 
territory and behind the fighting troops that are hostile to the Reich and German 
people." 1 33 They were required to maintain good relations with both the Wehrmacht and 
various police units in order to better achieve this goal. 1 34 Indeed, the Wehrmacht and its 
associated intelligence units frequently flagged potential targets for the Einsatzgruppen 
and then contributed troops to aid in their elimination. 1 35 As is now recognized in the 
scholarly literature, such incidents show the complicity of the German army in atrocities 
129 Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland, l 0. 
1 30 Ibid. 
1 3 1 Ibid., 1 L 
1 32 Ibid., 12. 
1 33 Ibid., 1 3. 
1 34 Ibid. 
1 35 Ibid., 1 6-20. 
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on the Eastern front, contrary to the earlier popular notions of a blameless regular 
army. 136 
The concept of the Einsatzgruppen was revived when Germany invaded Russia in 
1941. Like their predecessors, these new Einsatzgruppen were formed of men from the 
"Security Police (Gestapo and Kripo) as well as . . . [the] intelligence apparatus (Security 
Service, or SD)." 137 These groups could be supplemented by small Waffen-SS units or 
assorted police units as the situation warranted. 138 Four of the new Einsatzgruppen, 
numbering approximately 3,000 men each, were assigned the letters A, B, C, and D and 
deployed behind the advancing German lines in Russia. 139 They were arranged 
alphabetically from north to south, with Einsatzgruppe A operating in Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia and Einsatzgruppe D operating in Ukraine. A fifth Einsatzgruppe was 
formed in July of 1941, and formed "the permanent Security Police force in the areas of 
the 1939-41 Soviet occupation zone in former eastern Poland." 140 As they had been in 
Poland, the Einsatzgruppen were again responsible for "eliminating hostile elements" in 
the newly occupied territories, through mass executions behind the front lines. 
Interestingly, their justifications for these atrocities and missions of liquidation 
bear little resemblance to the rationales expressed in Das Schwarze Korps for eliminating 
the Jewish presence in Germany, which had been primarily economic. According to this 
earlier theory, the Jews were exploiting the German economy for their own gain, which 
1 36 See, for example, Omer Bartov, Hitler 's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third 
Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 1 37 Browning, Ordinary Men, 9. 138 Ibid . 139 Ibid., 10. 140 Ibid. 
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was detrimental to the average German. On the whole, the rationalizations in the Hale 
papers are considerably more "practical," in that they portray Jews as an imminent, rather 
than general, threat. Within the 77 relevant documents I examined, I found nine 
categories of rationalizations for mass murder. 14 1  The most prevalent rationalization, 
constituting 38.8% of the total, was that Jews had to be eliminated as a "practical 
measure" to ensure the safety of German soldiers and uninvolved civilians in general in 
occupied areas. A specific form of this justification, constituting 24.7% of the total, was 
that the Jews were the driving force behind Bolshevism and that therefore Jews helped 
Russian soldiers in any way they could, thus making them a military threat that needed to 
be eliminated. The idea that military measures against the Jews were justified because 
the general non-Jewish population of the area in question welcomed them placed third, 
comprising 1 7  .6% of the total. _Less common rationales included the earlier predominant 
idea that Jews posed an economic threat to occupied areas (4.7%), which had been a 
prominent theme in Das Schwarze Korps, that Jews posed a threat to public health 
(2.4%), and that Jews were infiltrating the Aryan race (1 .2%). Surprisingly, the 
documents do not dwell on the idea that the German people are the only ones who see the 
threat that the Jews pose: this idea is mentioned only once, constituting 1 .2% of the total. 
The remainder of this chapter will examine each of these rationales in greater detail, and 
will then compare the results of this investigation with the results of the examination of 
Das Schwarze Korps. 
14 1  Please note that several of these documents were counted twice when calculating 
percentages because they contained multiple rationales. As such, I studied 77 relevant 
documents but divided by 85  when performing my final calculations. 
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The most common justification for murdering Jews, that they posed a general 
threat to the German military and to the general civilian population, is perhaps also the 
most interesting . In the case of the military, the argument usually runs that Jews oppose 
German control and so conspire to subvert their occupiers in any way they can. Often, 
this opposition takes the form of allegations of direct force exerted against German 
operatives. For example, a situation report of August 30, 1941 alleged that in Pinsk, 
"Jews fired on a sentry of the town militia" as well as shooting "a member of the Militia 
. . .  from ambush." 142 As punishment for this supposed crime, 4500 Jews were 
murdered. 143 An operational situation report from August 7, 1944 repeats this theme, 
stating that Einsatzkommando 1 0a of Einsatzgruppe D carried out reprisals against the 
Jews of Petschanka due to "riots and attacks against the Wehrmacht ." 144 These reprisals 
consisted of shooting 97 Jews and taking 1756 hostages. These hostages were hardly 
safe: indeed, the report states explicitly that hostage-taking had become routine and that 
hostages "are executed on the slightest pretext." 145 Jews were also executed in cases 
alleging treason . For example, a situation report from August 7, 1941 states that 
Einsatzkommando 11 b of Einsatzgruppe D had concentrated the Jews of Thigina and 
liquidated 15 5 of them "as a reprisal for giving signals to the Red Army ." 146 
142 Book 9, Document 932, 30 August 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries . 
143 Ibid. 
144 Book 9, Document 744, 07 August 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville, Libraries. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Book 9, Document 744, 7 August 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
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This supposed threat to the Wehrmacht could be extremely obscure. For example, 
a report dating from August 2, 1941 dealing with Sonderkommando l Oa's activities near 
Kodyma employs a number of very vague reasons for murdering Jews. Among these are 
that "Jews had gathered in groups of 10 - 12 and had . . .  adopted a very hostile attitude" 
toward German forces. 147 Other Jews "had behaved in an insubordinate manner to the 
German military." 148 A memorandum to the Feldkommandantur 810 of the 
Feldgendarmarie from February 1 5, 1943 repeats this theme. This document states that 
in the "village of Ikor, a Jewess who had also showed her hostile attitude toward the 
Germans was treated according to regulations together with a 3 years old child and a 
newborn infant." 149 This chilling bureaucratic document is especially significant because 
it introduces the idea of collective guilt: the woman was supposedly guilty of harboring 
anti-German sentiments, but two children who had apparently done nothing to merit their 
treatment "according to regulations" were shot with her, presumably as a result of her 
alleged crimes. In short, the threat presented to the Wehrmacht did not have to be 
specific: instead, Jews could be shot for speaking out against German soldiers even if 
they have no obvious plan to harm them. 
The idea that Jews needed to be eliminated in order to protect German soldiers 
was still present late in the war: a division morning report dating from August 30, 1944 
states that the 69th infantry division "met with resistance from Jews who had prepared 
147 Book 9, Document 740, 2 August 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Book 9, Document 786, 1 5  February 1943, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
48 
defense positions" while passing south of Stakiai-Pamityvis. 1 50 These rebels were 
defeated quickly, and one Russian was taken prisoner along with 19 Jews. 1 5 1  All of these 
captives were handed over to the SD, who presumably murdered them. 
The alleged Jewish threat to German troops could also be seen on a larger scale 
elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe : for example, a memorandum dated February 3, 1943 
(i.e. during the German and Italian occupation of France) to the Commander-In-Chief 
West states that, "For urgent security reasons it is imperative that all Jews be removed 
from all border and costal districts." 1 52 These Jews were to be concentrated in the interior 
of France so that they could be deported east at a later date. Such a deportation would 
eliminate alleged Jewish operations against the Wehrmacht from loosely policed 
territories, as was theoretically the case at the time the memo was written. 153 
The Jews were, of course, presumed not to be above sabotage. For example, a 
war diary (Stamped "Top Secret !") dating from August 12- 1 5, 194 1  states simply that in 
the "course of an action carried out in Rudjna and Trojanow 26 Jewish Communists and 
saboteurs were seized and shot." 1 54 These Jews were killed by Einsatzgruppe C, which 
was operating in the vicinity of Novo Ukrainka at the time. Another journal, this one 
dated August 29, 194 1, mentions that Einsatzgruppe B shot a Jewish woman who had 
1 50 Book 9, Document 724, 30 August 1944, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 5 1  Ibid. 
152 Book 9, Document 653, 03 February 1943, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 53 Ibid. 
1 54 Book 9, Document 932, 30 August 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
49 
been acting as a saboteur while operating in Smolensk. 1 55 This alleged sabotage could 
also take the form of spreading rumors. For example, a memorandum to the 
Counterintelligence Officer dated August 6, 1941 tells of a Ukrainian woman (who could 
understand but not speak Yiddish) who claimed to have eavesdropped on a secret 
conversation between local Jews and Bolsheviks. According to her report, these persons 
were not only planning armed resistance against the occupying Germans, but had also 
intended to "pick up and collect leaflets dropped by German planes requesting the 
Ukrainians to start again working in the fields and in this way to impede and void our 
propaganda." 1 56 
The notion, advanced as a pretext to genocide, that Jews posed an imminent threat 
to the civilian population is more obscure. Usually, these arguments dealt with the 
allegation that the Jews were somehow controlling the population, usually economically. 
For example, a war diary dated August 23, 1941 provided an update on a situation that 
had been mentioned in previous reports. In this instance, local Jews had been accused of 
preventing the population of Ananjew from bringing in their harvest. The dispatch 
claimed that the local population was willing to work, but "resistance was partially shown 
toward an orderly harvesting caused at the instigation of Jewish inhabitants"1 57 of the 
region. To rectify the situation, Einsatzkommando 12 of Einsatzgruppe D shot 94 Jews. 
A situation report dating from September 3, 1941 speaks of a much more direct threat to 
155 Book 9, Document 858, 29 August 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 56 Book 9, Document 738, 06 August 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
157 Book 9, Document 856, 23 August 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
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the civilian population. In this instance, a group of security police "had" to shoot 300 
Jews because the "Jews of Ananjew had threatened the ethnic German citizens of 
Ananjew with a blood bath after the German troops would leave." 1 58 Thus, in this 
instance, the security police were preventing an immediate threat - massacre - rather than 
an impending threat - starvation. 
The Jews also allegedly threatened the Wehrmacht by collectively and 
individually collaborating with the Soviet Army. For example, the situation report from 
August 28, 1941 also mentions that "11 Jews were executed in the villages of Szuchari 
and Jasna. Some of these had . . .  carried on Communist agitation." 1 59 One of these, it 
was reported, had even been a political Commissar, and he was of course promptly 
executed. 160 In an instance described in a letter to Commander of the Army Rear Area 
Korueck dated August 20, 1941, although 4,000 Jews left when the Soviet Army 
surrendered the town, it "was found by Sonderkommando 10b [Woehler's group], that in 
spite of this, there are collaborators of the Communist Party and of the N.K.V.D. among 
the Jews." 1 6 1  A situation report from July 6, 1941 also draws this connection between 
Communists and Jews, alleging that "in Garsden the Jewish population had supported the 
Russian frontier guards in the defense against the German attacks." 162 In consequence, 
these Jews were executed along with many other people. Another report, dated July 17, 
1 58 Book 9, Document 861, 3 September 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 59 Book 9, Document 858, 28 August 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
160 Ibid. 
1 6 1  Book 9,  Document 884, 16 November 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 62 Book 9, Document 921, 6 July 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
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1942 and discussing the situation in Ukraine, claims that in the "course of the security­
police measures taken, 36 communist functionaries as well as 76 Jewish-bolshevist 
officers, among them political commissars, were found to be ringleaders" of a planned 
uprising in a POW camp. 163 All of these prisoners were, of course, executed. 
A popular variation on this argument proposed a larger conspiracy between Jews 
and Bolsheviks. According to this theory, Jews were. not just prone to helping the Red 
Army in their fight against Germany. Instead, Jews were said to be in fact the main 
proponents of Bolshevism. Therefore, it was allegedly their fault that there were 
Communists, and therefore a war, in the first place. This concept of "Judeobolshevism" 
was embraced by a number of high-ranking Nazi officials, including Hitler himself. 
According to Eberhard Jackel, it "was Hitler's conviction that the war of conquest against 
Russia would be an easy undertaking since the Bolshevik regime was made up of Jews 
who . . .  were unfit to build a state." 164 Indeed, Russia's fall was to be the crowning 
example of Nazi racial theory's validity. 165 The concept of "Judeobolshevism" is also 
connected with the idea of the "universal mission" of anti-Semitism. According to this 
concept, because Jews do not have any type of territorial state, their "ultimate goal is the 
denationalization, the promiscuous bastardization of other peoples, the lowering of the 
racial level of the highest peoples as well as the domination of this [ resulting] racial 
mishmash through the extirpation of the folkish intelligentsia and its replacement by the 
163 Book 9, Document 925, 1 7  July 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
164 Eberhard Jackel, Hitler 's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power, Trans. Herbert 
Arnold (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1972), 54-55. 
165 Ibid., 55. 
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members of its own people."166 Thus, Germany cannot defeat the Jewish menace alone: 
instead, the "fight against the Jews . . .  was a task for all mankind."167 As we have already 
seen, however, the Nazis stressed that mankind as a whole did not yet recognize the 
"Jewish threat ." 
The best example of the concept of "Judeobolshevism" is expressed in a situation 
report from November 5, 1941. According to this document, 
Einsatzgruppe C [then operating near Kiev] found that the dominant role of Jews 
in the USSR in the fields of politics, economy, and culture to be greater than was 
anticipated. There is scarcely another country that is so strongly under the 
absolute rule of an alien group of oppressors and exploiters than the Soviet Union . 
The tvranny of the Jews in the USSR extends without exception to all spheres of 
life. 168 
The author continues for four more pages discussing, in detail, alleged Jewish dominance 
in the Communist Party, economics, fine arts and sciences, and finally in national 
education and specifically the education of youth. 169 This point recurs in a memorandum 
from Lieutenant-Colonel Keitel to Fuhrer Headquarters dated September 12, 1941. 
According to Keitel, the "fight against Bolshevism necessitates indiscriminate and 
energetic accomplishment of this task, especially also against the Jews, the main carriers 
of Bolshevism."170 This theme is repeated in a war diary dating from October 1, 1941. 
In this instance, the diary's writer states that the "battle against Bolshevism commands a 
ruthless and energetic drive above all also against the Jews, the main supporters of 
166 Ibid., 104. 
167 Ibid., 105 .  
168 Book 9, Document 880, 5 November 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
169 Ibid . 
170 Book 9, Document 609, 12 September 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
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Bolshevism." 17 1  In other words, the war could not end until the Bolsheviks have been 
defeated, and the Bolsheviks would not and could not be defeated until the Jews had been 
eliminated. 
A few documents expound on the tangible benefits that occur after extirpating 
Jews from a particular area. For example, a report from September 25, 1941 mentions 
that "the clothing of evacuated Jews secured by the SD are being decontaminated and 
issued to needy ethnical [sic] Germans and/or Ukrainians." 1 72 Jewish property was not 
going to waste either: the "mayor has been ordered to list the Jewish apartments . . . [t]he 
apartments are assigned to homeless ethnical [sic] Germans by the mayor." 1 73 This idea 
is repeated in an activity and situation report dating from November 25, 1941 . The report 
recounted that after the Jews in Kiev had either been arrested or shot, their money, 
"valuables and clothes . . . [were] secured and placed at the disposal of the NSV (National 
Socialist Peoples' Welfare Organization) for the equipment of racial Germans and . . .  the 
needy population." 1 74 Thus, removing the Jews was said to have immediate and tangible 
benefits: the favored Aryans could benefit from using their property, instead of allowing 
it to remain in the hands of the degenerate Jews. 
F�nally, we note again the idea that local non-Jewish populations welcome the 
removal of the Jews, and so this removal is said to be justified. For example, one 
Einsatzgruppe stated that in Simforopol, the population (which was reputed to be openly 
17 1 Book 9, Document 745, 1 October 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
172 Book 9, Document 865, 25 September 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Book 9, Document 868, 25 November 1941 , Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
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anti-Semitic) appreciated the German actions against the Jews to the point that "in some 
cases [they] spontaneously bring . . .  Jews to the Kommandos to be liquidated." 1 75 A later 
report from Simferopol confirmed this observation, stating that the "population generally 
welcomed the elimination of these elements." 176 This sentiment was said to be present in 
other places as well. For example, a situation report dating from April 16, 1942 
mentioned that the population of the Crimea "in the majority has welcomed the measures 
taken against the Jews." 1 77 Indeed, the population was said to be helping the German 
occupiers with their task by making denunciations against Crimean Jews. 1 78 These 
assertions of gratitude could be extremely helpful to the German troops involved in 
massacring Jewish populations. Instead of having to acknowledge that they were killing 
innocent people, they could instead tell themselves that they were actually helping 
uninvolved civilians by eliminating a factor in their lives that had long been oppressing 
them. In other words, they were doing in an "orderly" manner what these people had 
long wanted to do themselves. In an odd way, this focus on others anti-Semitism was 
prefigured by the focus on Rumania in the preceding chapter. In that instance, the 
Rumanians were praised for eliminating the supposed Jewish threat to their economy. In 
this instance, the killers did not have to acknowledge their own anti-Semitism: instead, 
they could tell themselves that they themselves were not actively anti-Semitic, but rather 
they were efficiently helping other people who happened to be anti-Semites. These 
1 75 Book 9, Document 893, 12 December 1941, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 76 Book 9, Document 900, 09 January 1942, Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 77 Book 9, Document 916, 16 April 1942, The Winfield B. Hale Papers, University of 
Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
1 78 Ibid. 
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killers could in some sense again circumvent the idea that they had become truly 
complicit in atrocity. 
In short, the SS reports contained in the Winfield B. Hale papers present the Jews 
as a tangible rather than a potential threat. Instead of the ideas vented in Das Schwarze 
Korps in the prewar years of Jews dominating Germany economically and Jews 
infiltrating the Aryan race, we see Jews allegedly conspiring against the German military 
in all its forms, planning to harm the ethnic Aryan population, and conspiring with the 
Soviet forces against the German occupiers. Indeed, the local population could be used 
as a crucial pretext: the Jews were said to have become such a nuisance over the years 
that the citizens of the affected areas welcome their removal. Thus, the reasons that these 
documents give for eliminating the Jews are significantly different from the reasons 
advanced in the editions of Das Schwarze Korps that I discussed in the previous chapter. 
In Das Schwarze Korps, we see the Jews allegedly posing an economic threat: according 
to the newspaper's contributors, if Jews are allowed to remain in the German economy, 
they will eventually destroy it. Das Schwarze Korps also alleges that Jews sponge off 
honest Aryan citizens even while they attempt to infiltrate the Aryan race . . In contrast, 
the reports contained in the Hale papers allege that the Jews pose an immediate and 
practical threat to both German troops and innocent civilians. Thus, they must be 
executed to prevent their supposed imminent atrocities, in a classic case of argument by 
psychological projection. In short, the themes expounded in Das Schwarze Korps are 
largely absent from these documents. This contrast needs to be addressed in more detail 
and forms the central issue of the following, concluding chapter. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
In general, what this thesis shows is that the ideological reasons for forcing Jews 
out of the German economy presented in the 1938 and 1939 issues of Das Schwarze 
Korps are significantly different from the justifications presented for killing 
"undesirables" given by the Einsatzgruppen reports contained in the Hale papers. In 
1938 and 1939, pivotal years in the portrayal of the Jews, Das Schwarze Korps details a 
number of reasons why Jews supposedly need to be eliminated from European society. 
The most common of these pretexts was that Jews posed an economic threat to Europe as 
a whole. Das Schwarze Korps wrote on this threat in many forms. The most common of 
these forms accused Jews of damaging the European economy. For example, assorted 
articles contended that German Jews damaged trade with "enlightened" countries 
(specifically, the example of Rumania loomed large) that had already pushed Jews out of 
their economic sphere, that dishonest Jewish businessmen cheated hardworking Aryans, 
and that Jews refused to work to support themselves and thus unnecessarily drained 
Germany's much-needed resources. 
This supposed "Jewish threat" was depicted in other forms as well. For example, 
Das Schwarze Korps expressed concern about Jews infiltrating the Aryan race, either by 
marrying Aryans (this alleged threat usually took the form of Jewish men marrying 
Aryan women) or by assuming traditionally "German" names. The newspaper also 
expressed concern about what is considered the lagging size of the Aryan population. 
For example, the birth announcements in Das Schwarze Korps were not only intended to 
announce a new child's arrival, but also to encourage by example, so that Aryan couples 
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would reproduce and so prevent Europe's "racially pure" population from being overrun 
by supposedly inferior populations both indigenous to Europe and transplanted from the 
non-European world. 
By contrast, the themes expressed in the Nuremburg Trials documents do not 
indicate that the men of the Einsatzgruppen and their associated police squads were 
motivated to kill by ideology identical to the one articulated in Das Schwarze Korps. 
Instead of portraying the Jews as an economic threat that needed to be eliminated, these 
documents indicate that these men stated that they killed for immediate, "practical" 
reasons. The most common reason these reports give for murdering Jews was that Jews 
supposedly posed an imminent threat to the W ehrmacht, the Einsatzgruppen, or the ethnic 
non-Jewish civilian population of a particular location. This threat could take many 
forms. In some cases, the Jews were accused of taking direct action against the 
occupying forces: for example, Jews were frequently alleged to have acted as snipers, 
collaborated with partisan bands, or engaged in sabotage. In other cases, the supposed 
Jewish threat went far beyond any specific area and was presented as universal and 
omnipresent. In these instances, Jews were identified as the main supporters of 
Bolshevism. According to this theory, Jews controlled the Soviet Union and were 
collaborating with the Red Army. Thus, the Jews were held to be theoretically 
responsible not only for innumerable acts committed against German troops or ethnic 
Germans, but also for the very existence of the Soviet Union. Thus, this argument ran, 
German forces would have to eliminate the Jews in order to win the war with Russia. 
Certainly, the Jews were occasionally mentioned in terms similar to those in Das 
Schwarze Korps. For example, there were five mentions of Jews as an economic threat, 
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one mention of the idea that the German people were the only ones to see the threat that 
the Jews pose, and one mention of the charge of Jews infiltrating the Aryan race. 179 
These references are, however, far outnumbered by documents indicating that Jews were 
killed due to immediate, "practical" reasons. It is not, however, safe to conclude that 
ideology played a subordinate in the Holocaust. There are also considerable numbers of 
documents in the Hale collection that do not give any reason for the murder of Jews. 
Thus, there is no way to tell what the motive behind the murders described in these pages 
was : it could have been practical, but it could also have been ideologically based. There 
is simply no way to know relying solely on the evidence used in this thesis. 
The issue of the accuracy of documents in the Hale collection must also be 
considered. In those reports that state reasons for mass murder explicitly, there is in fact 
no way to know for certain whether or not the report's writer had recorded those reasons 
with total accuracy. It does not, however, seem likely that those writers would have lied 
to any great extent as these were internal memoranda not intended for wider circulation. 
The Nazi regime was extremely anti-Semitic and pursued multiple avenues to remove the 
Jews from German society. Thus, if the killing squads operating in the East were killing 
Jews because the men participating in those massacres were anti-Semitic and so wanted 
the Jews dead, there would be no reason for them to hide it. Indeed, it is extremely likely 
that this sentiment would be applauded. There was certainly no punishment associated 
179 Documents portraying Jews as an economic threat : Book 9, Documents 743, 856, 93 1 ,  
934, and 880; Document indicating that Germans are the only ones to see that threat : 
Book 9, Document 9 1 1 ;  Document expressing fear that Jews are infiltrating the Aryan 
Race : Book 9, Document 880; All documents are from the Winfield B. Hale Papers, 
University of Tennessee (Knoxville) Libraries. 
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with the expression of such sentiments, as is shown by the fact that no discipline was 
meted out to those report authors who provided no pretext for their murder of Jews. 
It is also unlikely the Allied translators altered the documents significantly when 
preparing for the Nuremburg Trials. These trials were designed to find designated war 
criminals and punish them, not to study the intricacies of Nazi thought and policy. In 
other words, the point of the Nuremburg trials was to convict, not to consider. Thus, 
these translators would have had no motive to help the accused by providing them with 
excuses for their actions and thus possible pardons. Indeed, if the translators were 
altering documents, one would expect them to make the Einsatzgruppen seem more anti­
Semitic than they actually were, since such a portrayal would make them even more 
obviously guilty and thus more likely to be convicted. In short, although we cannot be 
sure that those who wrote the reports were being completely honest about their 
motivations, it is unlikely that these statements are particularly and consistently 
inaccurate. 
One of the most interesting ideas that emerges when examining the evidence 
presented in this thesis as a whole is that of SS men projecting their own anti-Semitism 
onto others. We see this idea first in the Das Schwarze Korps cartoon dealing with 
Rumania. Here, there is no direct mention of German anti-Semitism. Instead, the 
cartoonist shows a Rumanian complaining about his country's inability to "cleanse" itself 
of Jews without being slandered in the international press, which was, of course, 
supposedly controlled by Jews. In other words, what we see here is Rumanian anti­
Semitism and a Rumanian desire to force the Jews out of its economic life. There is no 
mention of any German influence in the creation or maintenance of this attitude. As 
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such, it is Rumania that has "enlightened" itself by deciding to exclude Jews: Germany, 
far from being anti-Semitic "barbarians," is merely reacting to the same threats in order 
to improve its own _situation. The absurdity of Nazi activists then also complaining in 
1938 and 1939 that Germany is not anti-Semitic enough is patent. 
The idea of projecting one's own anti-Semitism onto others resurfaces in the Hale 
papers. Here, however, we see this projection on an individual, rather than on a national, 
scale. In general, these documents show German troops convincing themselves that the 
indigenous peoples of the areas that they were operating in wanted the Jews living near 
them to be eliminated. Thus, if the German occupiers kill local Jews, they are not 
indulging their own anti-Semitism: rather, they are doing the local population a favor by 
accomplishing what that population would do itself if it were able, but in an orderly and 
efficient fashion, rather than in the disorderly "pogrom anti-Semitism" otherwise 
characteristic of Eastern Europe. Thus, Germans are not forced to face their own anti­
Semitism in either of these cases. Instead, they can allow themselves to believe that they 
are acting reasonably and that any massacres or other "distasteful activities" that they 
find themselves involved in were forced upon them by "outsiders." In other words, both 
those people reading Das Schwarze Korps and the German soldiers involved in the 
genocide on the Eastern Front can, with a minimum of creative thinking, attribute both 
their actions and their anti-Semitism to someone else. 
In short, according to the evidence presented in this thesis, the Einsatzgruppen 
apparently did not kill because they had been comprehensively indoctrinated in the years 
preceding the war to believe that Jews should die nor because they had been specifically 
trained ( and hence desensitized) to do so. Although these two factors may have 
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influenced them, these men killed for a completely distinct reason: their own claim of 
necessity. In other words, they "had" to kill such "undesirable" people as Jews and Poles 
in order to protect themselves and the civilian populations of the areas they were 
stationed in. In sum, this evidence supports neither those scholars who argue that the 
Einsatzgruppen killed due to ideology (in particular, Goldhagen, Koonz, and Rossino) 
nor those who contest that the Einsatzgruppen killed because they had been specifically 
trained to do so (most prominently Browning). Instead, it would seem to back such 
authors as Aly and Heim, who argue that the Holocaust's origins can be explained 
through "practical" motives and pragmatic strategic and tactical motivations. Of course, 
none of these motives, specious or not, in any way diminish the enormity of the crimes 
committed by the Einsatzgruppen and their associated units against their victims or serve 
to absolve, excuse, or lessen the culpability of the Nazi regime as a whole. The 
assumptions from which the "practical" measures followed were clearly monstrous in 
their own right. 
Obviously, more research is needed on this topic. A potentially profitable future 
project would be to examine other documents, especially memoirs and oral histories, in 
order to study what factors motivated the individuals involved with the Einsatzgruppen to 
kill. It would also be useful to study each Einsatzgruppe operating in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union separately in order to determine whether or not the factors discussed 
previously operated in all four units or if they were peculiar to only one or two, 
suggesting different group dynamics. Finally, it would be profitable to engage in a 
detailed comparison of the motivations of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland during 1939 and 
the motivations of the Einsatzgruppen in Russia during 1941 in order to see whether or 
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not their motivations changed as a result of different factors in the campaigns they were 
participating in. In short, in spite of all the research that has already been done on the 
subject, the debate about the Einsatzgruppen's motivations is far from over, and the 
stakes - the question of what produces genocidal properties and readiness to violence -
are as important as the topic is disturbing. 
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Appendix A: 
Images published in Das Schwarze Korps 
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RuinOnien und die ,, Weltpresse u 
Figure 1 
Cartoon entitled "Rumanien und die "Weltpresse" appearing in the January 1 3, 1 938 
edition of Das Schwarze Korps. 
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Figure 2 
Cartoon entitled "Englische Arbeitslose" depicting the state of the unemployed in 
England appearing in the January 26, 1938 edition of Das Schwarze Korps. 
Figure 3 
Image of a young boy presented with birth announcements in Das Schwarze Korps. 
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Figure 4 
Image of a young girl presented with birth announcements in Das Schwarze Korps. 
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Figure 5 
Advertisement for the Mauser Rifle appearing in the July 1 3 , 1 939 edition of Das 
Schwarze Korps. 
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